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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Of The Case

Nature

Zane Eugene Lumpkin appeals from

his

judgment 0f conviction, following a jury

trial,

for

possession of methamphetamine.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

In October 0f 2018,

(R., p.8.)

Ofﬁcer Fisher asked Lumpkin, who “appear[ed]

step out 0f his vehicle.

despite

Ofﬁcer Zachary Fisher pulled Lumpkin over for trafﬁc

commands

to

(Id.)

Lumpkin stepped

do otherwise, so the ofﬁcer handcuffed him.

in his pocket.

the pipe out of”

(R., p.9;

(TL, p.78, Ls.8—13.)

it.

which

state lab testing later

state

information part

II

charged
alleging

not guilty and the case

At

trial

was

hands in his pockets”

(R., pp.8-9.)

t0 hide;

Lumpkin admitted he had

The residue

conﬁrmed.

“[t]here

was a

large

amount 0f white residue”

tested presumptive positive for

methamphetamine,

(R., p.9; Tr., p.124, Ls.2-8.)

Lumpkin with possession of methamphetamine and ﬁled an
Lumpkin was
set for trial.

a persistent Violator. (R., pp.47-50).

Lumpkin pleaded

(R., p.34.)

the state called Ofﬁcer Fisher (TL, pp.68-1 14) and the state lab technician (TL,

pp.1 15-29) to testify, and played a portion of the ofﬁcer Video for the jury (Tr., p. 76, L.7

L23;

1

State’s EX. 1).

The

state also

Citations t0 “Tr.” refer to the jury

PDF

ﬁle.

a

TL, p.96, Ls.16-25; p.136, Ls.23-251.) Ofﬁcer Fisher “pulled

Lumpkin’s pocket and noticed

inside

The

be very nervous and [ﬁdgety],” t0

out, but kept “putting his

Ofﬁcer Fisher asked Lumpkin what he was trying

meth pipe

t0

Violations.

Page numbers

—

p.77,

admitted the meth pipe, sealed in a plastic evidence bag, into

trial transcripts that

are

found in the ﬁrst part 0f the 208-page

refer to the transcripts’ internal pagination.

evidence.

(TL, p.90, L.18

—

Lumpkin

p.91, L.9; State’s EX. 2.)

testiﬁed (TL, pp.134-47) and

played a different portion of the ofﬁcer Video (TL, p.99, L.1 — p.100, L20; Def. EX. A).

Following the presentation 0f evidence, the

district court

gave the jury the following

instruction:

INSTRUCTION NOE
Certain items that have been admitted into evidence

substance residue.

T0 preclude contamination of

may

contain controlled

the evidence and to preclude

such residue from coming into contact With you, the evidence has been placed in
sealed plastic bags. You are not t0 unseal the plastic bags when Viewing the
evidence during deliberations.

(R., p.1 12.)

During closing arguments, defense counsel claimed “Mr. Lumpkin didn’t know meth was
in the pipe.” (Tr., p.162, Ls.3-4.)

She argued, along similar

measureable amount.” (TL, p.162, Ls.4-5.) As she put
it

just looks like

smoke

it,

lines, that the residue

“wasn’t even a

law enforcement “couldn’t measure

0r something Within the pipe, and that’s considered meth.”

(TL, p.162,

Ls.5-8.)

The prosecutor’s response,

t0

Which Lumpkin made no obj ection, was

[Defense] Counsel also talked about the residue,

and

it’s

This

is

smoke.

And

interesting.

evidence

may

it’s

it

tells

as follows:

not a weighable amount

reference another jury instruction for you,

1’11

So

how

number

18.

you, certain items that have been admitted into

contain substance residue.

T0 preclude contamination of

the

evidence and t0 preclude such residue from coming into contact With you, the
evidence has been placed in sealed plastic bags.

You

are not to unseal the plastic bags

When

dealing with the evidence during

What do you think that means? If there’s nothing in those ziplock
would
bags, Why
you have a jury instruction telling you don’t open the bag
because you might come into contact With it, right? So if you want to talk about,
deliberation.

well, it’s not a weighable amount,
it’s

nothing,

it’s

garbage.

It’s

it’s

nothing,

nothing,
it’s

I

think the defendant testiﬁed that

blow-Off.

it,

If

it

was nothing,

if it’s nothing, literally,

why would you have

an instruction

speciﬁcally telling you don’t open the bag, because it might contaminate you.
There’s obviously something in there, right; and [the state lab technician] is able
t0 test

it.

was nothing, nothing would show up. If she was testing something
that was not testable, Why would she come into court and say What I found was
methamphetamine? She would say, What I found was nothing.

Again,

if

(TL, p.163, L.17

it

— p.164, L20.)

The jury found Lumpkin
Violator enhancement.

two years ﬁxed.

guilty of possession of

(R., pp.88-90.)

The

district court

(R., p.127.)

Lumpkin timely appealed.

(R., p.13 1-33.)

methamphetamine and the
sentenced

Lumpkin

t0

persistent

ﬁve years with

ISSUES
Lumpkin
I.

states the issues

Did

the State

on appeal

commit

as:

prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments

by

open an evidence
Mr. Lumpkin possessed methamphetamine?

telling the jury that the district court’s instruction not to

bag proved
II.

Did

that

the district court impermissibly punish Mr.

Lumpkin

for exercising his

constitutional right t0 trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Lumpkin

failed t0

show fundamental

error because

remarks actually affected the outcome 0f the

II.

Has Lumpkin

failed to

show

he

fails to

show

the prosecutor’s

trial?

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

Lumpkin

A.

To Show Fundamental Error Because He Fails To Show The
Remarks Actually Affected The Trial Proceedings

Fails

Introduction

In closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury

telling

you don’t open” the sealed evidence bag

the prosecutor put

Lumpkin did not
was

Prosecutor’s

it,

“[t]here’s obviously

object.

(Tr.,

p.163, L.17

“[i]f

it

“why would you have

was nothing.”

something in

—

p.164, L.15.)

prosecutorial misconduct that amounts t0

there, right.”

On

appeal,

ﬁmdamental

error.

essentially “told the jury that the district court’s instruction

methamphetamine,” therefore “reduc[ing] the
methamphetamine. (Appellant’s

The

ﬁmdamental

error

165 Idaho 115,

come

Lumpkin now argues

He

this

claims the remarks

proved the substance was

were improper. However,

This requires him to demonstrate,

that is not the

among

other things, that

it is

that the statements “actually affected the trial proceedings.” State V. Miller,

_, 443 P.3d 129,

error.

(TL, p.164, Ls.13-14.)

burden” of proving the pipe contained

133-34 (2019) (emphasis added). Because Lumpkin does not

close to showing the remarks actually affected the

fundamental

As

Because Lumpkin had no objection to the remarks below he must show

0n appeal.

from the record

p.164, Ls.4-10.)

brief, p.9.)

state agrees that the prosecutor’s statements

end 0f the inquiry.

clear

State’s

(Tr.,

a jury instruction

trial

proceedings he

fails t0

show

Of Review

Standard

B.

Idaho’s courts review claims of prosecutorial misconduct “not preserved 0n appeal

through an objection

at trial” for

fundamental

State V. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 141,

error.

P.3d 806, 815 (2014). T0 establish fundamental

334

error,

the defendant bears the burden 0f persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates

one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional

(2) plainly exists (Without the

rights;

need for any additional information not contained in

the appellate record, including information as t0 whether the failure t0 object

a tactical decision); and (3)
State V.

C.

Peg,

was

was not harmless.

150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

Lumpkin

Fails

To Meet His Burden To Show Any Of The

Prosecutor’s

Remarks Actually

Affected The Trial Proceedings

For the ﬁrst time on appeal, Lumpkin argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by
asking the jury

“Why

[they]

sealed evidence bag “[i]f

there,

right.”

prosecutor

it

would have an

was nothing,” and
The

(TL, p.164, Ls.10-14.)

may not

instruction speciﬁcally telling

telling

state

“attempt[] t0 secure a verdict

trial,”

factor than the

law

Nevertheless,

Lumpkin

fails t0

Supreme Court recently clariﬁed

1,

something in

A

set forth in the

m

and must “guard against anything

tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced” at

Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 440, 348 P.3d

2

“[t]here’s obviously

agrees these remarks were improper.

0n any other

jury instructions and the evidence admitted during

would

them

you don’t open the”

trial.

that

55 (2015)?

meet

his

burden

“that the third

t0

show fundamental

error.

The Idaho

prong of Perry requires that the defendant

concedes the argument improperly requested the jury t0 draw a factual
inference from the jury instruction, the argument did not reduce the state’s burden of proof.

Although the

state

(m

Appellant’s brief, p.9.) The jury was properly instructed 0n that burden.
1

10.)

(E

R., pp.92-94, 107,

demonstrate that the clear error in the record—i.e., the error identiﬁed in the ﬁrst and second

prongs—actually aﬂected the outcome of the
P.3d

at

133-34 (emphasis added).

proceedings” must

itself

Not only

trial

that,

proceedings.”

m,

165 Idaho

at

_, 443

but the “[W]hether the error affected the

“be clear from the appellate record.” Li

at

trial

_, 443 P.3d at 133-34.

As

a result, defendants can n0 longer rely on claiming an error simply had a “reasonable possibility”

0f affecting the trial—that lower standard

prong ofPerry.”

Li. at

_, 443 P.3d

“no longer appropriate or descriptive of the third

is

at 134.

Thus, even granting that there was an error here, and assuming

Lumpkin must
affected the

The
large

still

show

it

state

—

from the appellate record”

Lumpkin has not met

01:01:13.)

pipe,” and admitting

it

see this for themselves

The jury

was

this burden.

inside of the tube” of the pipe he found in

The jury could

also

clear in the record,

that the error “actually

The ofﬁcer testiﬁed

had a strong case against Lumpkin.

amount of white residue

01:00:47

also “clear

proceedings.” Li.

trial

p.78, Ls.8—13.)

is

it is

that “[t]here

Lumpkin’s pocket.

0n the ofﬁcer Video.

(State’s EX.

1,

03:

1

1-03: 16.)

(T12,

(E Def‘s EX. A,

watched the Video 0f Lumpkin admitting

in his pocket.

was a

“I

have a meth

The ofﬁcer testiﬁed

that

based 0n those admissions, the ofﬁcer’s “training and experience,” and “the White residue inside

0f the pipe,” the ofﬁcer chose “a methamphetamine NIK-Kit” and ﬁeld tested the residue. (TL,
p.80, L.21

— p.81,

The jury

L.3)

also heard

not weighable (because

it

from the

weighed

.1

state lab technician.

grams or

far as the testing.” (T12, p.1 18, Ls.6-17; p.123,

test the residue

and she concluded

Ls. 1 5-17; p. 124, Ls.2-8.)

that “the

less), that

She testiﬁed

that While the residue

was

did not “change what” she would “do as

L.24 — p.124, L.8.) The lab technician was able t0

sample contained methamphetamine.” (TL, p.1

18,

Furthermore, Lumpkin’s

own

extent he had any defense to make,

it

testimony only tended t0 prove the state’s case.
boiled

down

to his

own

personal opinion that residue

not methamphetamine:

Q:

Were you

in possession

of meth during

this

whole incident?

A: N0, ma’am.
Q:

And why d0 you

say that?

it is residue, ma’am. I just borrowed the pipe from a friend because I
had the money in my pocket t0 go and pick up some. That’s What we were going
to do because I just got her out ofjail, we were going to get—I ain’t going to sit
here and lie—I was going to g0 and get some dope, and that’s What the pipe was

A: Because

for.

And What does

residue

mean to you?

Garbage.

So you weren’t charged with any possession of marijuana,
?@?@?.>@P.>Q

is

that correct?

No, ma’am.

Did you use the pipe

in

your pocket t0 smoke the marijuana?

N0.

Did you know

that the residue in the pipe tested

was methamphetamine?

No, it’ s considered blow- off to anybody who smokes meth. And blow- off ls
Whenever you melt the bowl down, right, and you blow through the pipe it will
put a White ﬁlm 1n the pipe. Well, it’ s not something that you want t0 inhale or
anything like

that.

Q: So you said

A:

it

It’s,

like

I

said, garbage.

wasn’t even your pipe, you just borrowed

No ma’am.

Q: So are you guilty of possession of meth?

A: N0, ma’am.

T0

it?

the

was

Q:

Why do you say that?

A: Because

it’s

not meth as far as

meth smokes the

that the residue in the pipe

Iknew

that

And you
N0,

its

presence in the pipe?

had a white ﬁlm

it

don’t believe that

don’t.

I

was meth?

did not.

I

Or did you know
?@?@P.>QP.>Q

know. Imean, none of—nobody who smokes

stuff that’s in the stem.

Did you know
N0, ma’am,

I

in

it,

yeah, because

it

was blow-off.

was meth?

But I’m not an expert, I just—

So basically you’re saying you’re not

guilty of possession of meth?

No, ma’am, I’m not. I don’t think that I am. But
decide, that would be up t0 the ladies and gentlemen here.
Q:

And Why,

A: Because,

again,

like

I

that’s not

up

t0

me

t0

do you think you’re not guilty?

said,

it

was garbage. Ma’am,

it’s

residue.

I

admit willingly to

having a pipe.
(Tn, p.138, L.21

— p.140, L25.)

On cross—examination, Lumpkin continued along

Q

A
Q

:

:

:

Did you hear them

A
1t

:

something

that’s left over?

Yes.

Okay, would you agree with that deﬁnition?

A: That’s

Q

testify that residue is

similar lines:

left

over?

Yeah.

N0, because technically, the blow- off ls from the ﬁrst, whenever you ﬁrst melt
down. Left over would be after you smoked it, and it would still be there.

°

Q: Excess 0f what?

The

excess, the garbage, the stuff that isn’t pure that

you don’t want

to

smoke.

Excess methamphetamine?
Yes,

sir.

?@P?@P.>@F.>

So blow-off/residue
It’s

No, Iwould
But I’m not
p.144, L.1

excess methamphetamine?

garbage methamphetamine, yes.

So you would agree

(T12,

is

not.

sitting

— p.145,

that residue in the pipe is

Iwould say that

he did not

know

was garbage,

the residue

Instead,

it

quite clear: he

knew

Lumpkin’s only claim was

the pipe “had a white

that

t0

And even Lumpkin

light

(T12,

p.139, L.15

meaningfully challenge the

actually tested the residue, and testiﬁed that the residue

residue

in it.”

could not take his

own

was methamphetamine.

(T12,

effect,

much

less

L.14.)

expert,

(Tr.,

Who

p.124,

hypothesis at face value: he cautioned that

was not meth, but he was “not an

had any

— p.140,

state’s

expert.”

(TL, p.140, Ls.4-14.)

of the overwhelming evidence that supported the jury verdict, Lumpkin

the prosecutor’s remarks

ﬁlm

armchair conclusions that “garbage” 0r “blow-off’ or “garbage

These made-up distinctions did nothing

know”

pipe.

he did not believe that residue was

something other than methamphetamine.

I

say.

was a product of smoking meth. Lumpkin was not even arguing

methamphetamine”

“as far as

would

was not denying he had a meth

own

Ls.4-8.)

I

sir.

meth, based on his

is

What

L.1.)

about the residue—he admitted he

p.140, Ls.10-12.)

that’s

here trying t0 convict myself either,

Lumpkin’s own testimony made

Nor was he denying

it

methamphetamine?

an actual

effect,

on the

fails to

show

In

that

verdict.

Furthermore, the jury was properly instructed that the “The law requires that your
decision be

made

solely

0n the evidence before you.”

10

(R., p.93.)

The jury was

also correctly

instructed that, “In determining the facts,

trial”;

that

is,

you may consider only the evidence admitted

in this

“the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any

stipulated or admitted facts.”

(Id.)

Finally, the district court instructed the jury that

conclude from the fact that an instruction has been given that the court

is

it

“must not

expressing any opinion

as to the facts.” (R., p.1 10.)

Errors can “be cured

the

trial

court’s direction.”

by proper

E

instruction,

and

it

must be presumed

State V. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 422,

that the jury

obeyed

414 P.3d 234, 244 (2018)

(quoting State V. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 905-06 n.6, 828 P.2d 1304, 1310-11 n.6 (1992));
also State V. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,

489, 399 P.3d 804, 816 (2017)
the trial court in reaching

(Ct.

App. 1994).

768 P.2d 1331 (1989); State

(“We presume

its verdict....”);

trial,

Which

is

Lankford, 162 Idaho 477,

that the jury followed the jury instruction given

State V. Rose, 125 Idaho 266, 269,

We must therefore presume the jury followed its

the evidence admitted at

V.

ﬂ

yet another reason

by

869 P.2d 583, 586

instructions3 t0 consider only

why Lumpkin

fails t0

show any

error

actually affected the verdict.

On

appeal

Lumpkin does not meet

affected the jury verdict.

in play;

Lumpkin argues

his

It is

that

t0

show

the prosecutor’s remarks actually

as if the 01d “reasonable possibility” standard

he discusses why, based 0n purported weaknesses in the

conclude the remarks had an effect 0n the

3

burden

also

worth noting

trial.

(E

state’s case,

substance residue.

still

someone might
But

Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)

that the instruction the prosecutor referred to stated that “[c]ertain items

have been admitted into evidence may contain controlled substance residue.”

(emphasis added).)

was

(R.,

p.112

Instruction 18 did not say that State’s Exhibit 2 did contain controlled

We

invitation to infer things

presume
from it.

that the jury followed Instruction 18 itself, as

11

opposed

to

any

guesswork about What might have happened below

m,

any error actually aﬂected the proceedings.

Even

if

Lumpkin could

conjecture, his claims

satisfy

on the

still fail

M’s

merits.

is

Lumpkin does not show

insufﬁcient.

165 Idaho

at

that

_, 443 P.3d at 134.

actually—affected test With could-have-affected

Lumpkin argues

that the state’s case

was “tenuous”

because the “methamphetamine in the pipe was not a weighable amount—there was no weight to
it.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

state’s

This misapprehends the nature of the state’s evidence and the

burden of proof. Residue

residue weighed less than

.1

is

a physical substance and

— p.124,

Moreover, the exact weight 0f the residue

LC.

§

37—2732(c).”

(rejecting the

and

II

precise, the

is

“[E]Ven trace or residual

irrelevant.

substances, such as methamphetamine, “fall within the scope of

that only a “usable quantity

of cocaine; that

is,

220

(Ct.

App. 1999)

an amount sufﬁciently

knowledge of possession” can predicate a controlled substances charge);

also State V. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 184,

345 P.3d 232, 243

(Ct.

conviction for possession of a controlled substance because there

establish

To be

L.1.)

State V. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 147, 983 P.2d 217,

argument

large to demonstrate

I

has a weight.

grams, and was accordingly lighter than what the state lab would (or

could) weigh. (Tr., p.1 18, Ls.6-17; p.123, L.24

quantities of” Schedule

it

[defendant’s]

possession

Lumpkin does not demonstrate

App. 2014) (afﬁrming a

was “sufﬁcient evidence

of the methamphetamine residue”).

possession of methamphetamine residue

is

still

In

other

possession 0f methamphetamine.

a weakness in the state’s evidence

ﬂ
t0

words,

As

such,

by simply pointing out the

obvious—that residue does not weigh much.

Lumpkin
appeared empty.”

additionally thinks that the state’s evidence

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

was tenuous because

“the pipe

In support of this he cites a photograph 0f State’s

12

Exhibit 2, the sealed plastic bag that contained the meth pipe.

(Appellant’s brief, p.12 (citing

State’s EX. 2).)

Lumpkin’s mistake here

testing—When

it

would

is

chronological.

He

is

relying

naturally have less residue in

on a picture 0f the pipe

(E

it.

State’s EX. 2.)

after the

The ofﬁcer

explained that the ﬁeld test he conducted “remove[d] some of that substance,” as did the state lab

testing.

(T12, p.90, Ls.1 1-24.)

amount of White residue

But the ofﬁcer also testiﬁed

inside 0f the tube area.”

because the ofﬁcer Video of the

meth pipe

again,

L.6-25.)

Lumpkin

So

at the

fails to identify

Lumpkin’s attempts

what happened below—that

As

t0

time Lumpkin had the pipe

downplay the

this

was a hotly

came down

was a

large

this is true

chose to play for the jury—shows the

—

(Def’s EX. A, 01:00:47

any weakness

We know

(TL, p.90, Ls.18—20.)

NIK test—which Lumpkin

clearly contained residue.

L20; p.102,

that prior t0 testing “there

it

01:01:13; Tr., p.99, L.14

did not appear empty at

— p.100,

all.

Here

in the state’s evidence.

state’s

evidence culminate in his offbeat theory of

contested, he-said, they—said case:

0f the identity of the substance—
did the jury believe the State’s Witnesses, 0r did the jury believe Mr. Lumpkin’s
testimony that the substance inside the pipe was not methamphetamine, and/or
such, this case

that

he did not

to a determination

know there was methamphetamine

in the pipe?

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

It is

true

enough

that this case, like

the identity of the substance.” (Id.)

0n

But the

many drug

cases,

“came down

fact that the state’s witnesses

that point does not transform this into a close case.

T0

to a determination

0f

and Lumpkin disagreed

the contrary, this

was a

run-of—the-mill

prosecution Where the state presented overwhelming evidence identifying the residue. A11 of the

evidence showed

it

was methamphetamine. A11 0f the

Lumpkin himself agreed he had

a

meth pipe

13

testing

that

afﬁrmed

contained

it

was methamphetamine.

residue

from

smoking

methamphetamine.

(TL, p.136, Ls.23-25; p.139, L.15

Lumpkin convinced himself that methamphetamine
purely his

own uninformed

This

is

speculation; after

all,

—

residue

p.140, L.12.)

And

t0 the extent

was not methamphetamine,

he was “not an expert.”

this

was

(Tr., p. 140, Ls.1-14.)

precisely why, following the remarks about the jury instruction, the prosecutor

refocused the jury on most important evidence—the opinion 0f the actual expert:
If

it

was nothing,

Why would you have

if it’s nothing, literally,

speciﬁcally telling you don’t open the bag, because

an instruction

might contaminate you.
and Ms. Rayner is able t0 test it.

There’s obviously something in there, right;

it

if it was nothing, nothing would show up. If She was testing something
was not testable, Why would she come into court and say What I found was
methamphetamine? She would say, What I found is nothing.

Again,
that

(TL, p.164, Ls.10-20 (emphasis added).)
In light of the

t0

show fundamental

much
clear

less

an actual

0n the record,

overwhelming evidence admitted
error.

effect,

Lumpkin does not show
0n the jury’s

as he must.

m,

verdict.

165 Idaho

at trial,

fails t0

that the prosecutor’s

Much
at

Lumpkin

less

meet

his

burden

remarks had any

effect,

does he show that such an effect

_, 443 P.3d

simply failed to meet his burden of proof 0n the third prong of

at 134.

m,

he

is

Because Lumpkin has

fails t0

show

error.

II.

Lumpkin

Where

a

demonstrating that

Fails

To Show The

sentence

it is

is

District

within

Court Abused

statutory

limits,

a clear abuse of discretion.

621, 628 (2016) (citations omitted).

T0

the

Its

Sentencing Discretion

appellant

14

Li

the

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

carry this burden the appellant

excessive under any reasonable View of the facts.

bears

burden of

1, 8,

368 P.3d

must show the sentence

is

A

sentence

is

reasonable if

it

appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective 0f

protecting society and to achieve any or

retribution.

The

Li.

differing weights

district court

when

all

of the related goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

deciding upon the sentence.

Li. at 9,

368 P.3d

at

629; State V. Moore,

131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding district court did not abuse

the need for rehabilitation). “In deference t0 the

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

0f a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might

628 (quoting State

at

discretion

0f punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed

in concluding that the objectives

P.3d

its

differ.”

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

its

View
368

at 8,

Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).

V.

Furthermore, “[a] sentence ﬁxed Within the limits prescribed by the statute Will ordinarily not be
considered an abuse 0f discretion by the

trial

court.”

Li

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90,

645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).

The imposed sentence of ﬁve years With two ﬁxed was within
years to

life.

E

LC. §§ 19-2514; 37-2732(c)(1).

that his sentence is excessive

8,

368 P.3d

at 628.

He

d0

fashioned based 0n his decision t0 go t0

Lumpkin argues

facts.

E

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

at

so.

Lumpkin’s only sentencing claim 0n appeal

brief, p.16.)

ﬁve

That leaves Lumpkin the burden of proving

under any reasonable View of the

fails t0

the statutory limit of

trial

is

that his

“sentence was improperly

and his continuing denial 0f

“that the district court’s

comments

at

guilt.”

sentencing and

(Appellant’s

its

imposition

0f reimbursement were not considerations about rehabilitative potential, but sought t0 inform Mr.

Lumpkin

that the district court

There

is

no doubt

that

was punishing him
it

“is

for exercising his

due process

rights.” (Id.)

improper for a court t0 penalize a defendant merely because

she exercises her right to put the government to

15

its

proof.”

State V. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149,

157, 730 P.2d 1069,

1077

(Ct.

App. 1986).

“A

court should not coerce a defendant into

more severe sentence.”

sacriﬁcing the right to assert innocence by threatening a

Thomas

V.

United

States,

Li. (citing

368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1966)). But, “[o]n the other hand, a sentencing

judge must consider the primary goal 0f protection 0f society and the related goals 0f deterrence,
rehabilitation

held that an acknowledgement of guilt

States V. Hull,

Gollaher

is

V.

Li “Many

and retribution when imposing sentence.”
is

a critical ﬁrst step toward rehabilitation.”

792 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.1986); United States

United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th

impermissible for a

trial

courts,” therefore, “have

Cir. 1969).

V.

Li; United

Floyd, 496 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1974);

Thus,

it is

well settled in Idaho that

“it

court t0 attempt to coerce a defendant into acknowledging guilt

through threats of harsher punishment,” but “a court

is

not entirely prohibited from considering

continued assertions of innocence as a factor in the sentencing decision.”

Idaho 812, 815, 229 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding “a court
defendant’s refusal t0 acknowledge guilt

because acknowledgment of guilt

is

When

State V. Kellis, 148

may properly

consider a

evaluating the defendant’s rehabilitation potential

a critical ﬁrst step toward rehabilitation”); State V. Stevens,

146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008); State

V. Sorrell,

116 Idaho 966, 969, 783 P.2d

305, 308 (Ct. App. 1989); State V. Nooner, 114 Idaho 654, 656, 759 P.2d 945, 947 (Ct. App.
1988); Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 157, 730 P.2d at 1077.

This

is

Why the Ke_11is

multiple times that

rights,

it

and the court continually linked

context

was

critical;

district court “said

could not and would not punish Kellis for exercising his constitutional

rehabilitation prospects.”

there

Court found n0 impermissible coercion Where a

148 Idaho

at

its

comments concerning

816, 229 P.3d at 1178.

because, as the Court of Appeals put

was enhanced punishment

it,

Kellis’s lack of remorse to his

Placing the court’s comments in

the

comments did “not show

that

for Kellis’s refusal to confess guilt, but rather a permissible

16

consideration 0f factors relevant to Kellis’s prospects for rehabilitation.”

at

1178-79.

Li

at

816-17, 229 P.3d

Likewise, the Lawrence Court found no impermissible coercion where the district

court “did not rely solely

on the appellant’s

refusal t0 admit guilt”

Lawrence’s continued claims 0f innocence “as

far as rehabilitation

and “could not Wholly ignore”

was concerned.” 112 Idaho

at

157, 730 P.3d 1077.

Lumpkin

In light 0f those standards,

He

sentencing discretion.

coerce

him

into

As

brief, pp.13-16.)

him

Viewed

in context.

You have

guilt

less

due process rights” (Appellant’s

Here

is

what the

that the district court

show, that the

district court told

a horrible criminal history and

Because 0f that and the jury’s ﬁnding,
Mr. Lumpkin, you certainly did not make

sentencing” showed

brief, p.16), those

I

this

it

“was punishing

comments have

are a persistent Violator in Idaho.

have to impose

I

at last a

ﬁve-year

don’t have a presentence report, but

process easy.

The Court took What I think is a very unusual step for this Court, but I brought
you over t0 try t0 explain to you What you were looking at in this case; and
actually, the State had made what I thought was quite a fair offer. And you, just
out of hand, were not even Willing to consider that.
where there didn’t appear
t0 be any defense, just in reading the reports, and that you were looking at the
persistent Violator. And you insisted 0n going t0 trial. Mr. Lumpkin, everyone
has a right t0 g0 t0 trial.
Itried to explain that you’re going to jury trial in a case

Then we

get to the end of the

about being railroaded and

So

I

just

wanted

to

trial

and you’re—yesterday afternoon you’re talking

how unfair everything was.

remind you of the

fact

of the choices that you made.

(1/16/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-24 (emphasis added).)

17

its

(E Appellant’s

Lumpkin:

you

underlying sentence. Character and attitude,

at

abused

district court tried to

through threats of harsher punishment.

Whether the court’s “comments

for

for exercising his

much

does not even allege,

acknowledging

show

fails t0

t0

be

The

district

rehabilitation.

Which showed

Lumpkin was

It

court

was

began by noting

his “[c]haracter

and

perception that

attitude.”

the

Lumpkin “did not make

(1/16/19 T11, p.13, Ls.5-8.)

how

and

court

district

consequences. (1/16/19

in turn,

reminded Lumpkin

Tr., p.13, Ls.24-25.)

View 0f Lumpkin’s prospects

that

“the

choices

These comments show the

for rehabilitation,

also noted that

It

Lumpkin was

Whether he had the potential for

(1/16/19 TL,

able to accept

rehabilitation.

that

p.13, Ls.19-20.)

There

is

Lumpkin

district court

fails to

that “everyone has a right to

simply n0 evidence that the

show

district

the district court “punish[ed]

rights” (Appellant’s brief, p.16), 0r otherwise erred.

abused

its

g0

As

him

for exercising his

such, he fails t0

DATED this 27th day 0f February, 2020.

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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the

right.

show

due process

the district court

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

/s/

To

court—despite understanding that

CONCLUSION
state respectfully requests this

trial.

to trial.” (1/ 16/19 Tr.,

sentencing discretion.

The

had a dim

Which was a proper consideration.

“everyone has a right t0 go to trial”—was punishing Lumpkin for exercising that

Lumpkin

And

made” had

[he]

Moreover, the court was plainly was not punishing Lumpkin for going to
contrary, the court expressly told

potential for

process easy,”

this

unfair everything was.”

A11 of this had direct bearing on whether

responsibility for his actions,

why

its

on Whether Lumpkin had the

“talking about being railroaded and

p.13, Ls.22-23.)

this

plainly reﬂecting
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